Revisiting Mental Simulation in Language Comprehension: Six Replication Attempts by Zwaan, R.A. (Rolf) & Pecher, D. (Diane)
Revisiting Mental Simulation in Language
Comprehension: Six Replication Attempts
Rolf A. Zwaan*, Diane Pecher
Psychology Department, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
The notion of language comprehension as mental simulation has become popular in cognitive science. We revisit some of
the original empirical evidence for this. Specifically, we attempted to replicate the findings from earlier studies that
examined the mental simulation of object orientation, shape, and color, respectively, in sentence-picture verification. For
each of these sets of findings, we conducted two web-based replication attempts using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Our
results are mixed. Participants responded faster to pictures that matched the orientation or shape implied by the sentence,
replicating the original findings. The effect was larger and stronger for shape than orientation. Participants also responded
faster to pictures that matched the color implied by the sentence, whereas the original studies obtained mismatch
advantages. We argue that these results support mental simulation theory, show the importance of replication studies, and
show the viability of web-based data collection.
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Introduction
The past decade has seen a shift in how language comprehen-
sion, and, in fact, all of cognition is conceptualized. The working
assumption up to about 15 years ago had been that the human
mind manipulates abstract, arbitrary, and amodal symbols and
that this combination of manipulation and symbolic representa-
tions constituted cognition. However, this kind of view suffers from
the grounding problem [1]. Abstract, amodal, and arbitrary
symbols have no connection to actual experience; they are floating
free in some mental ether and are therefore essentially meaning-
less. If we want to develop serious theories of cognition, Harnad
argued, these theories need symbols that are grounded in
perception and action. This idea was echoed in several later
papers [2],[3]. Focusing on language, Barsalou argued that
language comprehension should not be viewed as the disembodied
manipulation of symbols, the way a computer might do it. Rather,
cognition should be viewed as the mental simulation of events by
reactivating traces of earlier experiences. A large number of studies
in psychology and neuroscience have addressed these issues over
the past 12 years.
Although the notion of mental simulation as proposed by
Barsalou was appealing to some researchers at the time, including
the authors of this article, it was very much a theory in search of
evidence. In his article, Barsalou provides a ‘‘Gedankenexperi-
ment,’’ a thought experiment. In a mental simulation, he
proposed, there should be a difference between ‘‘the pencil is in
the cup’’ and ‘‘the pencil is in the drawer.’’ In the first case, the
pencil is in a vertical position but in the second sentence it is
horizontal. Barsalou argued that the pencil’s orientation should be
an automatic by-product of a mental simulation, whereas it is not
part of an abstract, amodal, and arbitrary mental representation.
For example, the propositional representation [IN[PENCIL,-
CUP]] does not contain information about the pencil’s orientation
and according to amodal theories such elaborative inferences
would not be made or they would require cumbersome logical
formulae.
When Zwaan and his students discussed this article during a lab
meeting, one of his graduate students, Rob Stanfield, came up
with a way to test this idea: by using a sentence-picture verification
task. The idea is simple but elegant. Participants read a sentence in
which the orientation of an object is implied, rather than stated
explicitly, and then they decide whether the object shown in the
subsequently presented picture was mentioned in the sentence.
The key feature of the paradigm is that the orientation of the
pictured object is manipulated; it is either horizontal or vertical.
This means that the pictured object’s orientation either matches or
mismatches the orientation of the object as it was implied by the
sentence. If language comprehenders perform mental simulations,
they should show sensitivity to this difference in orientation. The
results were as predicted by Barsalou’s simulation account.
Participants were faster to verify pictures that matched the implied
orientation than pictures that mismatched [4].
Crucial to the task is that the pictured object’s orientation is
irrelevant. The participants merely indicate if the object was
mentioned in the sentence or not, a very simple task given that it is
blatantly obvious when the pictured object is not mentioned in the
sentence. With the task set up like this, participants might be able
to perform well without understanding the sentence. They merely
have to keep track of the nouns in the sentence without actually
attempting to comprehend the sentences. To ensure that
participants engage in some minimal form of comprehension,
they are prompted at irregular intervals to recall a previously seen
sentence or answer a question about it. Importantly, to prevent
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tipping the participants off about the purpose of the experiment,
these tasks do not require the participants to think about the
orientation of the target object.
If comprehenders perform mental simulations, then other visual
dimensions should also be simulated. A subsequent series of
experiments [5] examined whether the match effect extends to
visual shape, arguably a more salient visual dimension than
orientation (e.g., [6]). They used the sentence-picture verification
paradigm (in Experiment 1) and sentences such as ‘‘The eagle was
in the sky’’ and ‘‘The eagle was in the nest,’’ in which the shape of
the target entity was implied. These sentences were followed by a
line drawing of either an eagle with its wings stretched out or one
with its wings drawn in. As in the orientation study, a significant
match effect was obtained, which appeared more robust than the
orientation effect, as indicated by the effect sizes in Table 1.
Other researchers have used the sentence-picture verification
paradigm to study other visual dimensions. One such dimension is
color. Connell [7],[8] presented participants with sentences such
as ‘‘John looked at the steak in the butcher’s window’’ followed by
a picture of a red (match) or brown (mismatch) steak. Surprisingly,
in light of the earlier findings, Connell obtained significantly faster
responses to the mismatching than to the matching items, which she
nevertheless interpreted as support for mental simulation theory.
Connell [8] argued that color, as opposed to orientation and
shape, is an unstable object property (for example, it can only be
perceived unimodally), which leads to a different pattern of
activation (for a detailed explanation, see [8]).
Our goal in this article is to take a step back and revisit these
experiments by performing exact replications. This goal is
motivated by three developments. First, we agree with an
increasing number of voices in the literature (e.g.,
[9],[10],[11],[12]) that express concern about the lack of
replications in the field. The field of psychology in general—and
perhaps the area of embodied cognition in particular—is aimed at
producing novel findings. This is understandable. For example, in
the case of embodied cognition, there was virtually no research 15
years ago, so that people became naturally interested in exploring
the generalizability of the early findings. If it is found that
comprehenders mentally simulate the orientation of objects, then
wouldn’t they also simulate shape, color, motion, and perspective
(to name just a few topics)? However, the downside of such a
novelty-seeking approach is that the original findings, which may
have spawned a large number of follow-up studies, are never
exactly replicated. As a result, it is not clear whether the literature
rests on a firm base. Our aim here is to examine part of the
firmness of the empirical base for mental simulation in language
comprehension.
Why did we select these three studies for replication, apart from
the fact that they all focus on aspects of the same topic, mental
simulations in language comprehension? What is their ‘‘replication
value’’? One criterion for assessing replication value is the impact
that a particular study has on the field. All three studies were
published in major journals. Both [4] and [5] have been cited quite
often. As of October 15, 2012 they have been cited 135 and 160
times in the Web of Science and 324 and 368 times in Google
Scholar, respectively. The color study [8] is younger and has not
yet received a large number of citations. Its replication value
derives in an important part from the fact that its results run
counter to theoretical predictions and earlier findings.
One can think of exact and conceptual replications as being on
a continuum, where by one endpoint (‘‘exact’’) can only be
approximated. No experiment can use exactly the same partici-
pants in exactly the same mental states and environmental
conditions as an earlier experiment [11]. However, the experiment
can use the same stimuli, the same instructions, the same
procedure and similar participants to approximate an exact
replication. Conceptual replications have the appeal that they
show the generalizability of an effect (and the added appeal
making the associated paper easier to publish) but the disadvan-
tage is that it is sometimes not clear whether the same
phenomenon is tested across different studies. There also occurs
a certain bias. If the study shows the effect in the expected
direction, the conceptual replication is deemed successful. If not,
then it is concluded that the phenomenon addressed in the second
Table 1. Overview of Match Effects (Median RTs) in Experiments 1a to 3b and in Previous Studies.
N
Match
M (SD)
Mismatch
M (SD) Difference p
Effect size (Cohen’s
d) BF01
Orientation
Experiment 1a 164 931 (318) 964 (354) 33 .020 .10 1.06
Experiment 1b 172 982 (382) 1020 (422) 38 .010 .09 0.46
Stanfield & Zwaan (2001) 40 838 (331) 882 (329) 44 .016 .13
1a and 1b combined 0.04
Shape
Experiment 2a 176 979 (356) 1036 (404) 57 .0002 .15 0.02
Experiment 2b 176 1056 (361) 1126 (404) 70 .0001 .18 0.01
Zwaan et al. (2002, Exp. 1) 42 697 (202) 761 (210) 64 .0008 .31
2a and 2b combined 0.01
Color
Experiment 3a 152 1221 (549) 1378 (750) 157 .0001 .24 0.01
Experiment 3b 152 1207 (395) 1292 (577) 85 .0237 .17 1.22
Connell (2007) 42 1369 (638) 1215 (509) 2154 .0039 2.27
Connell (2005) 60 1328 (577) 1190 (542) 2138 .0080 2.25
3a and 3b combined .01
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0051382.t001
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study is, after all, different from that in the first study. On the other
hand, exact replications have the disadvantage that they might
replicate an effect that is really due to a quirk in the stimulus
materials, rather than a genuine empirical manifestation of the
phenomenon under investigation. Thus, a combination of exact
and conceptual replications is ideal. Given the current paucity of
exact replications, however, we decided to try to replicate the
original studies with the same materials.
The second reason motivating this article is that the state of
affairs regarding mental simulations in language comprehension is
a little puzzling. Why would a study of orientation show a modest
effect, a study on shape a more robust effect, and a study on color
the opposite effect? Our goal is to address these questions and
suggest further avenues of research.
The third impetus for this research is more mundane.
Occasionally people have approached us at conferences claiming
some of these results are difficult to replicate, whereas others
appear to be more easily replicable. Failures to replicate can have
various reasons. First, failures to replicate are a statistical
possibility, either because the original finding was a type I error
or the replication was a type II error. Second, it could be that the
replication attempt was performed inexpertly. Third, it could be
that certain unknown factors contributed to finding an effect in the
original study but not in a replication.
A look at the published literature shows that there are relatively
few empirical studies investigating mental simulation of object
orientation along the lines of [4]. A recent example is [13], who
used a Dutch version of the orientation and shape stimuli in both a
listening and reading comprehension experiment with Dutch 2nd
to 6th graders. There are quite a few more mental simulation
studies of shape, several of which were initiated by Zwaan and his
colleagues. Their main reason for focusing on shape is that while
the orientation manipulation seems more elegant, the first studies
suggested that the shape effect is more robust, and therefore
seemed a better tool to investigate the role of such factors as age
[14], working memory span [15], negation [16], and comprehen-
sion skill [13] (although orientation was as strong a factor as was
shape in this study) in mental simulation. Each of these studies
showed significant match effects. Other research groups, investi-
gating expertise [17], hemispheric differences [18], and visual
spatial frequency [19] have also found the shape effect (limiting it
to domain experts, the left hemisphere, and low spatial frequency,
respectively). Recent unpublished data by Rommers, Meyer, and
Huettig replicated the match effect for shape but not for
orientation, although it should be noted that their study had low
power to detect an effect and they had intermixed orientation and
shape items, thus providing no exact replication. In short, the
shape match advantage has been replicated a number of times but
the evidence for the orientation match advantage is weaker.
It might be argued that having each sentence followed by a
picture engenders unusual comprehension strategies on the part of
the participants. However, three recent studies, each using a
different method, showed that similar effects occurred when
sentences were not followed by pictures immediately but were
separated by considerable spans of time. More accurate recogni-
tion of match than mismatch pictures for both shape and
orientation was found when there was a 45-minute delay between
sentence reading and picture verification [20]. The match
advantage was found even when pictures preceded sentences.
Elevated eye-fixation times were found for sentences that
mismatched the orientation of pictures presented 20 min earlier
as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment [21]. Finally,
significant modulations of the N400 response in event-related
potentials (ERP) were found when participants read sentences that
mismatched the shape of pictured objects presented as part of an
ostensibly unrelated experiment [22]. These findings indicate that
the shape match effect is not due to strategies that might be
invoked by alternating sentence reading and picture verification
on every trial.
The color effect is younger than orientation and shape and has
only been observed in two studies to our knowledge [7],[8].
Connell obtained faster picture verification responses when the
color mismatched than when it matched. It is puzzling that the
effect of color is the reverse of that of orientation and shape.
Connell proposed that color is processed differently than other
visual features such as shape. Color might be less important than
shape for identifying objects [23]. As we see it, this might predict a
smaller effect, but not a reversal of the match advantage.
Moreover, several studies have suggested that color information
is activated during object processing [24],[25],[26],[27] in a
similar fashion as shape information [28]. There was a positive
priming effect between names of objects that shared color, but
only if color was made relevant by a prior task [29]. Priming of
shape-related words, however, also depended on prior activation of
shape information [30]. Thus, color might be less important than
shape, but not to a large extent, and it is not clear that it is
sufficiently different from shape and orientation so as to explain a
negative match effect. To clarify these issues we investigated the
robustness and direction of match effects for the three visual
properties orientation, shape, and color.
An additional question is whether these effects are related to
imagery or other individual differences. Although imagery ability
and imagery preference are related to cognitive processes if they
involve similar operations [31],[32],[33],[34], some studies have
found no relation between imagery ability and effect size in
paradigms that investigated mental simulations [4],[35]. Although
it seems reasonable to assume that imagery and mental simulation
share some processing, especially those involved in perception,
imagery is based largely on conscious, effortful processes aimed at
solving a difficult task. Mental simulation, on the other hand,
might be a set of mostly unconscious processes that are recruited
automatically for conceptual processing. Moreover, while individ-
uals may differ in how much and what type of mental imagery
they recruit, mental simulation during language comprehension
might be a more universal mechanism and thus show less
individual variation. On the other hand, the typical participant
in psychology experiments might not be as representative of the
general population as one would hope. Undergraduate students
are a homogeneous group in terms of age and educational levels,
and may even comprise an unusual group in some respects [36].
To sum up, we report a series of experiments in which we
investigated the robustness of these three effects. We planned to
replicate each experiment twice with a sample from MTurk that
included more diverse ages and educational levels. In addition, we
were interested in whether individual differences could be
explained by imagery ability, age, or educational level. For this
reason, we investigated the correlations between individual match-
mismatch effect sizes and scores on imagery questionnaires, age,
and education.
In the following experiments, we provide two identical
replication attempts each for orientation (Experiments 1a and
1b) for which a significant match advantage was previously
obtained [4], shape (Experiments 2a and 2b), for which a
significant match advantage was previously obtained [4], and
color (Experiments 3a and 3b), for which significant mismatch
advantages were previously obtained [7],[8]. In each of the
replication attempts, we used the same experimental stimuli and
procedures as in the original experiments. Unfortunately, we did
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not have the exact filler items and comprehension questions of the
original studies anymore. For each set, we created new filler items
that matched the experimental sentences in structure and length
and the experimental pictures in style and color. The compre-
hension questions were similar as those used by [4]. We made the
comprehension questions comparable between experiments so that
the difficulty level would be similar between experiments. In a
departure from the original experiments, our replications were
web based. This allowed us to use large numbers of participants
and draw some conclusions about the generalization of research
findings beyond the psychological laboratory. In Appendix S1 we
discuss our use of web-based experiments in greater detail.
In each of the six experiments below, we used the same
participant-recruitment and participant exclusion plan. We
recruited 200 participants for each experiment. Of these, a large
percentage completed the experiment. We were interested in
running only native speakers of English. However, screening for
native speakers in MTurk is counterproductive because nonnative
speakers might falsely indicate that they are native speakers if they
are interested in participating in the experiment. To prevent this
problem, we asked participants about their native language at the
end of the experiment as part of a demographic questionnaire. We
excluded nonnative speakers of English; these comprised typically
a small number, ,10, in each experiment. We then excluded the
small number of participants who either appeared to have reversed
the response keys, having accuracy scores between .00 and .20. We
then excluded participants who appeared not to have reversed the
response keys but who had unusually low accuracy scores (,.80).
As these exclusion procedures often left us with unequal number of
participants per counterbalancing list, we eliminated the last-run
participants of the longer list to create equal-length lists.
In all experiments, we analyzed the data using the same
trimming procedures as those that were used in the original
studies. [4] and [5] used the median RT per condition. [7],[8]
trimmed the RTs by removing all RTs faster than 300 and slower
than 3000 ms and then removed responses that were more than 2
standard deviations from the participant’s mean in that condition.
Because of problems associated with standard significance testing,
especially when using large samples [37],[38],[39], we also
calculated the posterior probability favoring the alternative
hypothesis (i.e., the evidence for a match effect) using the JZS
Bayes Factor(BF01, calculated with Rouder’s web based applica-
tion at http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor), which provides the
odds ratio for the null/alternative hypotheses given the data
(where 1 means that they are equally likely, larger values indicate
more evidence for the null, and smaller values indicate more
evidence for the alternative).
Ethics Statement
The participants in all six experiments were recruited online
and voluntarily subscribed for participation in all of the described
experiments. Written consent was not obtained. This was waived
by the Ethics Committee of Psychology (ECP) at the Erasmus
University Rotterdam, the Netherlands because the experiment
was noninvasive and the results were analyzed anonymously.
Experiment 1a
Method
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system of which 189 completed the
experiment (102 female, mean age 41, range 18–64). The
participants received $1.50 for their participation in the experi-
ment, which lasted approximately 27 min. There were 7
nonnative speakers of English in our sample (Romanian, 2 Dutch,
Urdu, Spanish, Marathi, and Hmong). With the exclusion of these
participants, our sample included 182 native speakers of English.
Stimuli. For the sentence-picture task, a set of 78 sentences
and 78 black and white line drawings was used. The 48
experimental sentences were taken from [4]. These sentences
described 24 objects, once with an implied horizontal orientation
and once with an implied vertical orientation. The 48 experimen-
tal pictures, taken from [4] or similar pictures from other sources,
represented the same 24 objects as mentioned in the sentences,
once in horizontal orientation and once in vertical orientation.
Four versions were created, each with 24 sentence-picture pairs,
such that orientation matched for half of the pairs and mismatched
for the other half and each condition consisted of equal numbers of
vertical and horizontal items. Across the four versions, all items
were used equally often in the match and mismatch condition.
Because all experimental items required a ‘‘yes’’ response, 24
additional sentence-picture pairs were used as fillers. The filler
sentences were similar to the experimental sentences in length and
position of object nouns, but were followed by an unrelated
picture, thus requiring a ‘‘no’’ response. An additional set of 6
sentence-picture pairs (3 related, 3 unrelated) were used as warm-
up trials.
An adapted version of the Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ [33]) was used. This questionnaire instructs
participants to think of four different situations and then specifies
four aspects of the situation that they should try to visualize.
Vividness of the mental picture was rated on a scale of 1= perfectly
clear and vivid as the actual experience to 5= no image at all, you only know
that you are thinking of the object (descriptions for all five intermediate
points were also provided). We changed the spelling into American
English. In addition, items 9 to 12 were questions about a familiar
store (shop in the original version), and these were changed so that
they corresponded more to contemporary experiences than the
original version (9. The overall appearance of the store from the opposite side
of the road or parking lot. 10. The store’s name sign including its location,
colors, and shape. 11. You are near the entrance. The color, shape, and details
of the door. 12. You enter the store and walk into an aisle. You look at the items
and pick something you want.).
Procedure. The entire experiment was presented online
using the Qualtrics survey software suite. Participants first
completed a lexical-decision task with 14 low and 14 high-
frequency words. This task was used to familiarize them with the
task of making speeded responses to visual stimuli. Next
participants completed the sentence-picture task, followed by the
imagery questionnaire, followed by a series of questions about
participants’ notion of the purpose of the experiment, their
computer system, the environment in which they took the test as
well as demographic questions. The sentence-picture task started
with 6 warm-up trials. Following, the 24 experimental and 24 filler
trials were presented in a random order. A trial started with a left-
justified and vertically centered fixation point for 1000 ms,
immediately followed by the sentence, which started at the same
location as the fixation point. Participants pressed the p-key when
they had understood the sentence. Immediately following the key
press a horizontally and vertically centered fixation point appeared
for 500 ms, immediately followed by the picture. Participants
responded by pressing the a-key for ‘‘no’’ responses or the l-key for
‘‘yes’’ responses. Half of the filler trials were followed by a yes/no
comprehension question. The next trial started 500 ms after the
response.
The imagery questionnaire was also presented on the computer
screen, one item at a time. All response options were presented
below the item as buttons with the value of the option (e.g., Perfectly
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clear and as vivid as normal vision), and participants clicked on the
button of their choice.
Following the imagery questionnaire participants answered
questions about their age, gender, education (on a 7 point scale),
native language, the noisiness of their environment (on a 9 point
scale) and their computer settings.
Results
Two participants appeared to have reversed the response keys
as they had 0% and 8% correct responses, respectively. Another
six participants had accuracy scores ,80%, which was three times
less than the standard deviation from the mean response accuracy.
Data from these participants were also removed. Combined with
the removal of the participants who appeared to have reversed the
response keys (2), the removal of these 6 participants yielded
unequal numbers of participants across lists. To equate the
number of participants per list, the last-run participants of three of
the lists were removed so that each list had the same number of
participants as the shortest list (41). This means that the data
analysis involved 164 participants.
The medians are displayed in Table 1. The medians were
analyzed with an ANOVA with Match as a within participants
factor. There was a small but reliable match advantage of 33 ms,
t(163) = 2.36, p= .02, BF01=1.06. Accuracy levels were very high,
.98, and did not differ between conditions, t,1, BF01=15.49.
We also looked at the relation between match effects and
imagery ability. For each participant, we calculated the effect sizes
of the match effect using the data based on Connell’s outlier
criteria (because we could not use the medians to calculate
individual effect sizes). The effect size was calculated as the
difference between the means in the match and mismatch
condition, divided by the pooled standard deviations of the match
and mismatch conditions. We also calculated each participant’s
mean score on the VVIQ. Table 2 displays the correlations. The
correlation between the VVIQ scores and effect size approached
statistical significance, p= .06. Effect size did not correlate with age
and education level.
Thus, the evidence for a match effect was mixed. The p-values
indicated a significant match effect in the RTs, but the Bayes
Factor indicated that the RT data provided about as much
evidence for the presence and absence of an effect, and the
accuracy data even provided about 15 times as much evidence for
the null than for the alternative.
Experiment 1b
Method
Participants. Two-hundred participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system of which 190 completed the
experiment (123 female, mean age 31, range 18–63). The
participants received $1.00 for their participation in the experi-
ment, which lasted approximately 30 min. There were 6
nonnative speakers of English in our sample (Chinese, Korean,
Serbian, Gujarati, Romanian, Hindi). With the exclusion of these
participants, our sample included 184 native speakers of English.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were
exactly the same as those in Experiment 1a.
Results
Three participants had accuracy scores ,80%; data from these
participants were removed. To equate the number of participants
per list, the last-run participants of three of the lists (9) were
removed so that each list had the same number of participants as
the shortest list (43). This means that the data analysis involved
172 participants.
As shown in Table 1, there was a significant 38 ms match
advantage, t(171) = 2.61, p= .01 BF01=0.46. Accuracy was .98
correct in both conditions, |t|,1, BF01=11.34. Table 2 displays
correlations between individual effect sizes and VVIQ, age, and
education. Data from one participant were not entered into the
correlation analysis because for this participant there were too few
observations within Connell’s outlier criteria to calculate the SDs
and effect size. None of the correlations were significant.
Discussion
In both Experiments we replicated the published RT result [4].
The match advantages of 33 and 38 ms are comparable to the
44 ms found in the original study. The (small) effect sizes of .10
and .09 are also comparable to that of .13 in the original study. On
the other hand, the Bayesian approach indicated that the data
provided little evidence for the presence or absence of an effect.
Especially with large sample sizes, p-values might indicate
significance for effects that actually provide just as much evidence
for the null-hypothesis as for the alternative [37],[39]. The
disadvantage of using p-values is that it overestimates evidence
against the null with large sample sizes. Fortunately, the Bayes
Factor, on the other hand, tends to become more informative with
larger sample sizes [40]. Therefore, we combined the data from
Experiments 1a and 1b and calculated the Bayes Factor with a
larger sample size. For the medians, BF01=0.04, indicating
substantial evidence for the presence of an effect; that is, the
evidence for the alternative hypothesis is about 25 times stronger
than that for the null hypothesis. For accuracy, BF01=21.95,
indicating that there was no effect of match in the accuracy scores,
but these were close to ceiling.
The fact that the two MTurk experiments yielded significant
effects, however, is meaningful in that the effect was found in
noisier conditions than usual, with a much broader participant
population (in terms of age and education levels) than in the
laboratory. Also of note is that the effect in these experiments
cannot be due to experimenter effects, given that the entire
experiment was computerized. In sum, the orientation effect is
rather small, as also indicated by the Bayes Factor, but with large
samples the evidence for an effect was there.
Table 2. Correlations Between Individual Effects Sizes and
Scores on the VVIQ (Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire), Age, and Educational Level.
VVIQ Age Education
Experiment 1a .15 2.09 .12
Experiment 1b 2.12 2.05 2.01
Experiment 2a .05 2.09 .04
Experiment 2b 2.06 2.01 2.07
Experiment 3a .04 2.09 .06
Experiment 3b 2.03 2.07 2.10
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0051382.t002
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Experiment 2a
Method
Participants. Two-hundred participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system of which 199 completed the
experiment (114 female, mean age 34, range 18–69). The
participants received $1.00 for their participation in the experi-
ment, which lasted approximately 28 min. There were 6
nonnative speakers of English in our sample (2 Spanish, Georgian,
Japanese, Polish, and Romanian). With the exclusion of these
participants, our sample included 193 native speakers of English.
Stimuli and Procedure. Experimental stimuli consisted of
56 sentences and 56 pictures, taken from [5]. The sentences
described 28 objects, in two different implied shapes. The pictures
represented the same 28 objects as mentioned in the sentences,
once in the implied shape of one sentence, once in the implied
shape of the other sentence. Four versions were created, each with
28 sentence-picture pairs, such that shape matched for half of the
pairs and mismatched for the other half. Across the four versions,
all items were used equally often in the match and mismatch
condition. Because all experimental items required a ‘‘yes’’
response, 28 additional sentence-picture pairs were used as fillers.
The filler sentences were similar to the experimental sentences in
length and position of object nouns, but were followed by an
unrelated picture, thus requiring a ‘‘no’’ response. The procedure
was identical to that of Experiment 1a.
Results
For two participants, the response times were not registered
(that is, they were all 0). Two participants appeared to have
reversed the response keys as they had between 0% and 4%
correct responses. Another 4 participants had accuracy scores
,80%, which was three times less than the standard deviation
from the mean response accuracy; data from these participants
were also removed. Combined with the removal of the participants
without RTs (2), the participants who appeared to have reversed
the response keys (2), the removal of these 8 participants yielded
unequal numbers of participants across lists. To equate the
number of participants per list, the last-run participants of three of
the lists (9) were removed so that each list had the same number of
participants as the shortest list (44). This means that the data
analysis involved 176 participants.
As shown in Table 1, there was a significant 57 ms match
advantage, t(175) = 3.80, p,.001, BF01=0.02. Accuracy was very
high with .98 correct in the match condition and .96 in the
mismatch condition; this difference was significant, t(175) = 3.43,
p,.001, BF01=0.06. This replicates the published findings [5].
The MTurk participants were considerably slower. This could be
due in part to the fact that the MTurk participants were on the
average quite a bit older than the lab participants and also did not
participate in a controlled environment. Finally, as mentioned
earlier, the MTurk participants were slightly more accurate and so
may have put more emphasis on accuracy than on speed
compared to those who participated in the lab. Nevertheless,
despite these differences the original match effect was replicated
once more. The Bayes Factor indicates that the evidence for an
effect is very strong. Table 2 displays correlations between
individual effect sizes and VVIQ, age, and education. None of
the correlations were significant.
Experiment 2b
Method
Participants. Two-hundred participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system of which 188 completed the
experiment (117 female, mean age 34, range 18–63). The
participants received $1.00 for their participation in the experi-
ment, which lasted approximately 31 min. There were 5
nonnative speakers of English in our sample (Dutch, Spanish,
Tamil, Urdu, and Vietnamese). With the exclusion of these
participants, our sample included 183 native speakers of English.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were
exactly the same as those in Experiment 2a.
Results
Three participants had accuracy scores ,80%, which was three
times less than the standard deviation from the mean response
accuracy; data from these participants were removed. To equate
the number of participants per list, the last-run participants of
three of the lists (4) were removed so that each list had the same
number of participants as the shortest list (44). This means that the
data analysis involved 176 participants.
As shown in Table 1, there was a significant 70 ms match
advantage, t(175) = 4.07, p,.001, BF01=0.01. Accuracy was .98
correct in the match condition and .96 in the mismatch condition,
this difference was significant, t(175) = 3.94, p,.001, BF01=0.01.
Table 2 displays correlations between individual effect sizes and
VVIQ, age, and education. None of the correlations were
significant.
The results of Experiments 2a and 2b are very similar and
replicate those of previous studies. In all cases participants
responded faster and more accurately to pictures when the object
matched the shape implied by the sentence then when it
mismatched. Moreover, the Bayesian analyses indicated that in
both experiments the data provided very strong evidence in favor
of a match effect. Analyses of the combined data also resulted in
strong evidence, BF01s,0.01.
Experiment 3a
In Experiments 3a and 3b pictures matched or mismatched the
color implied by the sentence, as Connell [7],[8] investigated.
Method
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system of which 189 completed the
experiment (92 female, mean age 29, range 18–62). The
participants received $1.00 for their participation in the experi-
ment, which lasted approximately 25 min. There were 3
nonnative speakers of English in our sample (Tamil, Russian,
French). With the exclusion of these participants, our sample
included 186 native speakers of English.
Stimuli and Procedure. We used the same 24 experimental
sentences and 24 pictures as were used by [7],[8]. The sentences
consisted of pairs mentioning 12 objects, one sentence implied one
color and another implied another color. The pictures depicted
the objects in different hues such that each picture matched one
sentence and mismatched the other one. Four versions were
created, each with 12 sentence-picture pairs, such that color
matched for half of the pairs and mismatched for the other half.
Across the four versions, all items were used equally often in the
match and mismatch condition. Because all experimental items
required a ‘‘yes’’ response, 12 additional sentence-picture pairs
were used as fillers.
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The filler sentences were similar to the experimental sentences
in length and position of object nouns, but were followed by an
unrelated picture, thus requiring a ‘‘no’’ response. An additional
set of 6 sentence-picture pairs (3 related, 3 unrelated) were used as
warm-up trials. The procedure was identical to that used in the
previous experiments. The filler pictures were similar in style and
color to the experimental pictures; they were colored line
drawings. The comprehension questions were also new, these
were similar to those used by [4].
Results
Two participants appeared to have reversed the response keys
as they had between 0% and 9% correct responses. Given that
these participants had no or practically no valid RTs; their data
were eliminated. Another 18 participants had accuracy scores
,80%; data from these participants were also removed, in
accordance with our previous experiments. Combined with the
removal of the participants who appeared to have reversed the
response keys (2), the removal of these 18 participants yielded
unequal numbers of participants across lists. To equate the
number of participants per list, the last-run participants of three of
the lists (12) were removed so that each list had the same number
of participants as the shortest list (38). This means that the data
analysis involved 152 participants.
The original studies [7],[8] trimmed the RTs by removing all
RTs faster than 300 and slower than 3000 ms and then removed
responses that were more than 2 standard deviations from the
participant’s mean in that condition. This procedure resulted in
removal of 6.8% of the correct RTs. There was a 56 ms match
advantage [1232 vs. 1288 ms], t(151) = 2.31, p= .02, BF01=1.15.
Because we were concerned that the number of observations
removed by this procedure is rather high, we conducted an
additional analysis, using median RTs as we did for the previous
experiments. In this analysis, the match condition was 157 ms
faster than the mismatch condition, t(151) = 3.91, p,.001,
BF01=0.01. Participants were highly accurate and more so in
the match condition than in the mismatch condition, [.96 vs .93].
This 3% difference was significant, t(151) = 2.54, p= .01,
BF01=0.68. To compare [7], found .94 and .70 accuracy for
match and mismatch respectively, and [8] found .93 accuracy in
both conditions. Thus, the match condition was significantly faster
and more accurate than the mismatch condition, although the
Bayesian analyses indicated that only the median RTs provided
evidence for the effect. This result directly contradicts those of the
published studies [7],[8], who found significant mismatch advan-
tages (in response times at least). We will discuss this discrepancy
further after reporting the replication of this experiment. Table 2
displays correlations between individual effect sizes and VVIQ,
age, and education. None of the correlations were significant.
Experiment 3b
Method
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system of which 180 completed the
experiment (97 female, mean age 31, range 18–69). The
participants received $1.00 for their participation in the experi-
ment, which lasted approximately 24 min. There were 3
nonnative speakers of English in our sample (Dutch, Polish,
Spanish). With the exclusion of these participants, our sample
included 186 native speakers of English.
Results
Two participants appeared to have reversed the response keys
as they had between 9% and 17% correct responses. Another 17
participants had accuracy scores ,80%; data from these
participants were also removed. Combined with the removal of
the participants who appeared to have reversed the response keys,
the removal of these participants yielded unequal numbers of
participants across lists. To equate the number of participants per
list, the last-run participants of three of the lists (6) were removed
so that each list had the same number of participants as the
shortest list (38). This means that the data analysis involves 152
participants.
Using the outlier-removal plan of Connell, which resulted in
removal of 7.9% of the correct RTs, we found no difference
between the RTs in the match and mismatch condition [1253 vs.
1256 ms], t,1, BF01=15.46. As Table 1 shows, however, there
was a significant match advantage in the median RTs. The match
condition was 85 ms faster than the mismatch condition,
t(151) = 2.28, p= .02, BF01=1.22. Accuracy was higher in the
match condition, .97 than in the mismatch condition, .92. This
difference was significant, t(151) = 4.98, p,.001, BF01,0.01.
Thus, the match condition was both significantly more accurate
and faster than the mismatch condition, although the latter was
observed only for the medians and then the Bayesian analyses did
not indicate much evidence for an effect. This partly replicates
Experiment 3a and again contradicts the published results. Table 2
displays correlations between individual effect sizes and VVIQ,
age, and education. None of the correlations were significant.
Comparing Experiments 3a and 3b we see evidence for match
advantages, although in Experiment 3a the evidence was mostly in
the RTs whereas in Experiment 3b the evidence was mostly in the
accuracy. To obtain a better idea of the evidence we combined the
data from Experiments 3a and 3b and calculated the Bayes Factor
with a larger sample size. Using the trimmed RTs, BF01=5.26,
which provides substantial evidence for the absence of an effect.
For the medians, BF01,0.01, indicating very strong evidence for
the presence of an effect. For accuracy, BF01,0.01, also indicating
very strong evidence for the presence of an effect. The lack of an
effect in the trimmed RTs, compared with the analysis of the
median RTs shows that the use of Connell’s outlier removal
procedure eliminated a substantial part of the effect, suggesting
that the effect is in the tail of the RT distribution. This contrasts
with the match effect in the median RTs, however, because using
median RTs also greatly reduces the influence of outlier data. It
should also be noted that in this experiment each condition only
had six items, which probably resulted in noisier condition means
than those in other similar experiments. Another potential issue is
that we did not use the original filler items that Connell had used.
Using different fillers or comprehension questions might lead to (1)
different depths of processing [41], perhaps reliant more on
linguistic information rather than simulation aspects of represen-
tations, or (2) different strategies adopted by the participants,
either of which could lead to attenuation or possibly reversal of
effects. However, our filler items were close in all respects to the
experimental items, as is common in the sentence-picture
verification paradigm. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the use
of different fillers is the source of the reversal of Connell’s original
effect.
General Discussion
We set out to replicate three well-known findings in the
literature on mental simulation, namely on implied orientation [4],
shape [5] (Experiment 1), and color [7],[8]. Our replication
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attempts relied on the population accessible through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. This means that—compared to the typical
population of undergraduate psychology students—our partici-
pants were much more varied in age and educational background.
Therefore, our results have more generalizability across partici-
pants and environments than the original experiments. Another
advantage of this novel approach is the impossibility of experi-
menter effects given that the experiments were administered
entirely electronically.
Our findings are mixed. For orientation, we replicated the
original findings twice. As in the original study [4], the effect was
significant but rather small and the Bayesian analyses revealed that
only data from a large sample provided substantial evidence for an
effect. We speculatively attribute this to the fact that the object’s
orientation was seldom if ever relevant to the protagonist’s actions.
We know that comprehenders focus on the causal structure of
narratives (causes, effects, goals, outcomes; e.g., [42],[43]). Part of
the appeal of the original study [4] was the fact that it appeared to
be strongly pitted against finding a match effect. The orientation of
the target object is not central to the interpretation of the sentence.
Specifically, the orientation has no causal or goal-relevance; it is
mostly elaborative in nature. It fleshes out the interpretation of the
sentence but does not constrain or afford actions. For example,
whether the pencil is horizontally in a drawer or (almost) vertically
in a cup does not greatly constrain the actions that can be
performed with it. The writing implement is within easy reach and
can be used to write, draw, or do anything else with it that one can
do with a pencil. Compare this to shape. If an egg is whole it can
be broken but not directly eaten. If an egg is sunny side up, it can
be eaten, but it cannot be broken. Even if we take a less drastic
change in shape, if an eagle is in the sky, its movements have to be
tracked differently than when it is in the nest. It is well established
in the literature on discourse comprehension that comprehenders
use causal and goal information to forge coherent mental
representations of the incoming text [42],[44]. Of course the
stimuli in the sentence-picture verification paradigm are sentences
rather than connected discourse, but it is likely that participants
use their natural inclination to make inferences about actions
when reading sentences, which would promote representing the
(action-relevant) shape of objects but not so much their (action-
irrelevant) orientation. We surmise therefore that the relatively
small effect size for orientation is due to its limited action relevance
(at least in the stimulus sentences). We are currently investigating
this idea in a separate set of experiments.
We also provided two successful replications of the original
shape effect [5]. The shape effect is stronger than the orientation
effect. Unlike the orientation in our stimuli, shape was very often
relevant to the action described in a sentence. A live chicken
affords different actions than a fried one. Visually tracking a flying
eagle is different than observing a perched one. As noted in the
Introduction, shape information in general is more diagnostic for
categorizing objects than orientation or color. Because of the
importance of shape, it is much more likely to be represented in
the mental simulation of a sentence. Moreover, a mismatch will
have greater impact, because it is more likely to initially suggest a
different identity. We considered the possibility that the relative
strength of the shape effect is due to the fact that some shape
changes are, in fact, category changes. For example, an animal
changes into a piece of food. However, only three of the items in
our stimulus set were of this type. We also considered whether the
reversibility of the object was a factor (a perched eagle can become
flying one and vice versa but a broken egg cannot become whole
again). We addressed this in an exploratory way by performing
item analyses. These analyses suggested that the shape effect is not
due to a particular category of items.
Our findings regarding color are puzzling. Not only did we not
replicate the original findings by Connell [7],[8], we did, in fact,
find the almost perfect opposite pattern. One possibility is that the
color effect is weak and will therefore go in any direction, given
that the number of color items is small (only 6 items per condition).
This is also suggested by the differences in results between median
RTs and trimmed RTs. In all experiments that have RTs as
dependent measure, reducing the effect of outliers increases
statistical power. Different methods are available, and deciding
which method is best is rather complicated [45]. We decided to
use two different methods because these methods had been used in
the original studies. The methods we used differ in how many data
points are thrown out (none are thrown out when medians are
used), and in this case, with only a few observations per condition,
removing a few data points will have a relatively high impact.
Another complication is that one of the original studies [7]
observed a mismatch advantage in RTs but a huge match
advantage in accuracy. Thus, the effect of color match might be
too variable to draw any conclusions.
On the other hand, the pattern we observed twice in the
experiments reported here is in line with the other findings in the
literature and also seems to make more sense theoretically.
However, Connell [8] provides some reasons why color might
behave differently from orientation and shape; for example, in the
color experiments, subjects could also have relied on shape (and to
a lesser extent orientation) to make the verification judgments. A
reviewer pointed out that if subjects in the color experiments had
previously participated in the orientation or shape experiments,
they might have come to process objects in a certain way that is
different from the Connell experiments. We therefore re-examined
the data for the color experiments and excluded subjects who had
participated in the orientation or shape experiments.
Fourteen subjects in Experiment 3a had participated in earlier
experiments (Experiment 1a through Experiment 2b). Of these, 2
had already been excluded from the data due to other reasons
(because of low accuracy and to equate list lengths). This means
that 12 of the 152 reported subjects had participated in the shape
or orientation experiments. We excluded these participants and
where needed supplemented the lists to obtain equal numbers of
subjects per list by using subjects who had previously been
excluded from the initial analysis to obtain equal numbers per list
for that analysis. This left us with 148 subjects. There still was a
match advantage (1220 vs. 1380 ms), which was highly reliable
(p= .0002).
Sixteen subjects in Experiment 3b had participated in earlier
experiments. Of these, 4 had already been excluded due to other
reasons (low accuracy, end of list). This means that 12 of the 152
subjects had participated in an earlier experiment. We removed
the data from these 12 subjects and removed the data from a total
of four additional subjects at the end of two of the lists in order to
equate the number of subjects per list (it was not possible to
supplement the list of subjects with subjects that had previously
been removed from the main analysis to create equal numbers per
list because the shortest list had no ‘‘spare’’ subjects). This means
that the analysis included data from 136 subjects. The match
advantage (1197 vs. 1299 ms) remained significant (p= .012).
These analyses rule out that the effects we obtained were caused
by the fact that subjects were focused on shape or orientation due
to training in earlier experiments.
An additional important point is that color was action relevant
for only a few of the stimuli. For example, the color of a traffic light
seems quite relevant but the color of a leaf much less so. As we also
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argued when discussing the effect of orientation match, mental
simulation of color might be much stronger when color is relevant
for action than when it is not. Given our own findings as well as
theoretical considerations, we conclude that the mental simulation
of color in language comprehension deserves further study but that
it is likely that future studies will show match advantages rather
than mismatch advantages.
An important tenet of mental simulation theory is that mental
simulation does not equate mental imagery [2]. Mental imagery is
a conscious and resource-consuming process. Mental simulation,
on the other hand, is thought to be part-and-parcel of routine
cognitive processes. If mental simulation is mental imagery, then
one would expect the size of the match effect to correlate with
mental imagery ability. We found very little evidence that this is
indeed the case.
The work presented here has several methodological implica-
tions. The fact that replication attempts apparently sometimes lead
to the opposite pattern should give researchers pause and points to
the relevance of conducting replications. Mechanical Turk
provides a fast and powerful way to conduct replication studies.
An added benefit is that it allows one to use much broader samples
of participants than are typically available in psychology labs [46].
Our results show that it is even possible to collect meaningful
response-time data (see also Appendix S1). Overall, responses are
slower than in the lab. This is due in part to the fact that MTurk
represent a much larger age range than that of undergraduate
students; for example, our samples includes people in their late
teens as well as people in their late 60s. In part it is due to the fact
that MTurk participants participate in the experiments in
environments that may be considerably noisier than the typical
lab environment but that are far more representative of natural
environments. Finally, all responses were collected through
internet connections that may sometimes be slow. Apparently, at
least the orientation and shape effects are strong enough to show
up under such conditions (and perhaps also the color effect).
We hope to have achieved at least the following three goals.
First, we hope to have provided a better assessment of some of the
empirical foundations for research on mental simulation in
language comprehension. Second, we hope to have made a case
for the usefulness of replication attempts in psychological research.
Third, we hope to have shown that web-based replications are a
fast and efficient tool in this endeavor.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Validation of data-collection procedure via
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